Primary
Nexus Primary Mirror
The main archived onion address
❄ Nexus Primary Link (Archived)
nexusaldu7wwewcpcn4reptcp72rsaeogolfvjncafua2oywwswwyaqd.onion
❄ Nexus Link Archive
Archived collection of Nexus Market onion addresses. Historical reference with verification guides and phishing protection information.
Primary
The main archived onion address
❄ Nexus Primary Link (Archived)
nexusaldu7wwewcpcn4reptcp72rsaeogolfvjncafua2oywwswwyaqd.onion
Archive
Complete archived list of known Nexus onion addresses
nexusaldu7wwewcpcn4reptcp72rsaeogolfvjncafua2oywwswwyaqd.onion
nexusbbqsh42lvde337tiruwfbikusjhdfukr2roacd4m7t7j5esvtqd.onion
nexuscr3cittluc2rcu3qsyk4hcczor5py56nstpz4g4pohtfpt3qvqd.onion
nexusd6kh4at2iof2tg2a7vmzs5vz4ocdpc5v6onski4moafsj65lcid.onion
Last database update: January 9, 2026
Information
Why darknet markets use multiple onion addresses
Mirror links are alternative onion addresses that connect to the same Nexus marketplace infrastructure. When users access any mirror, they reach identical content, accounts, and functionality. The underlying database and platform remain unified regardless of entry point.
Nexus maintained multiple mirrors during its operational period. Each mirror had a unique onion address but served the same marketplace. This architecture provided resilience against various threats including server failures, network issues, and targeted attacks.
The technical implementation involved multiple server nodes that synchronized data continuously. User sessions could transition between mirrors if one became unavailable. This redundancy kept the platform accessible even during infrastructure problems.
DDoS attacks present constant threats to darknet platforms. Attackers flood servers with traffic to overwhelm resources and cause downtime. Multiple Nexus mirrors distributed traffic loads across separate infrastructure, making complete takedowns more difficult.
Law enforcement efforts also target marketplace infrastructure. Having multiple entry points complicated seizure attempts. Even if authorities captured one server, other Nexus mirrors could continue operating while administrators responded.
Geographic distribution improved access speeds for users worldwide. Different Nexus mirrors could be optimized for various regions. Users automatically or manually selected the fastest available connection point.
Security
How to verify onion links using PGP signatures
PGP verification remains the gold standard for confirming link authenticity. Phishing sites perfectly replicate legitimate interfaces, making visual inspection useless. Only cryptographic signatures prove that links originate from actual marketplace administrators.
The official Nexus public key should come from trusted sources established before the platform closure. Cross-reference keys found in multiple independent locations. Phishing operations may distribute fake keys, so verification from established community members adds confidence.
Use GnuPG software to import the public key. Run the command gpg --import nexus_key.asc after saving the key to a file. The software will confirm successful import and display the key fingerprint for verification.
Compare the imported key fingerprint against known-good values from trusted sources. Run gpg --fingerprint to display the full fingerprint. This step confirms you have the authentic Nexus key rather than a substituted phishing key.
Official mirror announcements included PGP signatures. Save both the message and signature, then run gpg --verify against them. Valid signatures confirm the message came from Nexus administrators. Invalid signatures indicate tampering or phishing.
Even with valid signatures, check links against multiple trusted aggregators like dark.fail. Legitimate mirrors appear consistently across verification sources. Discrepancies warrant investigation before accessing.
Protection
Identifying and avoiding fake Nexus sites
Phishing operations create pixel-perfect copies of legitimate marketplace interfaces. When users enter credentials on these fake sites, attackers capture login information. Subsequently, they access real accounts and steal any available funds.
The Nexus exit scam created opportunities for new phishing schemes. Attackers now operate sites claiming to be "Nexus restored" or "Nexus v2" to exploit users hoping the marketplace returned. These operations have no connection to actual Nexus administrators.
Fake Nexus mirrors spread through search results, forum spam, and social engineering. Some attackers even purchase search engine advertisements for related terms. The sophistication of modern phishing makes constant vigilance necessary.
Visual inspection cannot reliably identify phishing sites. Attackers replicate every design element including logos, colors, and layouts. Even subtle differences may reflect legitimate updates rather than indicating fraud.
PGP verification is the only reliable method. Without valid signatures from known Nexus keys, any site claiming to be Nexus should be treated as malicious. This applies regardless of how authentic the interface appears.
Bookmark verified links rather than following new ones. Even links from seemingly trusted sources may lead to phishing sites. Attackers compromise accounts and websites to distribute malicious URLs through otherwise reliable channels.
Never access Nexus links from untrusted sources. Search engines index phishing sites that may rank above legitimate results. Social media posts and forum messages can contain malicious links from compromised or fake accounts.
Use dedicated bookmark folders for verified onion addresses. Update bookmarks only after rigorous PGP verification of new mirrors. Delete old bookmarks when mirrors are officially retired.
Enable two-factor authentication to protect accounts even if passwords are phished. While this cannot prevent initial credential theft, it stops attackers from accessing accounts without the second factor.
If you suspect credentials were entered on a phishing site, act immediately. Legitimate platforms allowed password changes that would invalidate stolen credentials. Change passwords before attackers can use captured information.
Withdraw any accessible funds immediately. Phishing attackers typically drain accounts within hours of capturing credentials. Speed determines whether you or the attacker controls your balance.
Review account activity for unauthorized actions. Attackers may modify settings, change withdrawal addresses, or initiate transactions. Document any unauthorized activity for dispute purposes if applicable.
History
Timeline of Nexus infrastructure events
Nexus Market launched with a single primary onion address. The cyberpunk interface with rose-pink accents debuted. Initial user registration opened to early adopters.
Nexus expanded to multiple mirror links as user base grew. Additional servers improved capacity and geographic coverage. The platform established itself as a major darknet marketplace.
Multiple DDoS attacks tested Nexus infrastructure. Mirror redundancy proved valuable as attacks rotated between entry points. Administrators added additional mirrors to improve resilience.
Nexus reached peak user numbers with over fifty thousand registered accounts. The marketplace processed substantial transaction volumes. Multiple mirrors handled traffic distribution effectively.
Users reported withdrawal delays on Nexus in early January. Some mirrors experienced unusual downtime. Community members expressed concerns about platform stability.
All Nexus mirrors went offline simultaneously. Approximately fifteen million dollars in user funds were stolen. The platform administrators disappeared with no communication.
Fake Nexus sites appeared claiming to restore the marketplace. These phishing operations target users hoping for Nexus return. All current Nexus-branded sites are fraudulent.
FAQ
Common questions about Nexus onion links
Resources
Trusted tools for darknet security
Dark.fail aggregates verified onion links for major darknet services. The site checks link validity and provides PGP verification resources. A trusted starting point for accessing darknet platforms safely.
GnuPG provides the cryptographic tools needed for PGP verification. Import public keys and check signatures to confirm message authenticity. Available for all major operating systems.
The Tor Project maintains the browser and network infrastructure for onion routing. Download Tor Browser only from the official website to avoid compromised versions.
Explore detailed information and frequently asked questions